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"Behind the move to repeal the City's . . . license ordi-
nance which operates . . . as a tariff against itinerant . . .
merchants is the smouldering threat of a trade war ....
"... local dealers . . .fear nearby cities . . . may
pass reprisal ordinances ....
". . . repeal would throw the market wide open
depriving local dealers who pay local taxes, of trade . .. .
Indianapolis Times
October 26, 1940
To use the same figure of speech, it is only the outbreak
of hostilities along new battle fronts which presents a smoul-
dering threat because the truth is that war was declared a
long time ago!
In the discussions of interstate trade barriers little has
been said about municipal barriers' not for the reason that
they are non-existent but solely for the reason that the sourc-
es of material2 for the basis of discussion are generally in-
accessible. In brief, local trade barriers and burdens spring
from the same economic motives as do state and inter-
national tariff walls. Municipal trade barriers result from
the demands made on city councils by local merchants and
local industry based on the plausibly defensible ground that
inasmuch as the latter represent one of the chief sources of
local revenue they are entitled to, not an advantageous but
a protected position, when they meet competition from non-
local and frequently non-taxpaying competitors. Likewise,
* Professor of Government, Indiana University.
j Research assistant in codification of municipal ordinances.
As used herein the term trade barrier applies to ordinances which
show a preference to resident tradesmen or businesses over non-
residents. Ordinances restricting trade are not always labeled as
such, nor is it always possible to discern the real intention of a
council from a reading of an ordinance. One city created an effect-
ive barrier against the sale of coal brought from mines by individ-
ual truckers simply by amending its traffic code to prohibit the
parking of vehicles loaded with goods offered for sale. Blooming-
ton (Ord. No. 25, 1935).
2 Ordinances used herein were gathered from twenty-seven cities by a
state-wide Municipal Ordinance Project sponsored by the W.P.A.
and the Bureau of Government Research, Indiana University.
Throughout this discussion the reader should bear in mind that
many of these ordinances have been repealed or are "dead letters".
(220)
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in many instances the city councils can be convinced that the
discriminatory regulations requested by local interests are
merely incidental to the protection of health, safety and
morality of the community. Thus, it is by means of their
tax and police powers that cities erect municipal trade bar-
riers.
In Indiana the source of municipal authority is the legis-
lature. Municipalities are political subdivisions of the state
possessing such powers as are expressly conferred by statute
or which arise by fair implication." Because the legislature
cannot delegate a power it does not possess, state constitution-
al limitations on the legislature are ipso facto limitations on
city councils. Likewise, those restrictions in the federal
constitution limiting the powers of states apply equally to
cities. For this reason, a city may not enact an ordinance
which unduly interfers with interstate commerce,4 nor can
city ordinances be passed which have the effect of impairing
contract obligations5
Before examining the extent to which trade barriers
3 Courts usually say authority expressly stated or which may be reason-
ably implied or those which are necessary for the accomplishment of
the declared objects and purposes of the city (Dillon's Rule).
Local Union No. 26 v. Kokomo, 211 Ind. 72, 5 N.E. (2d) 624 (1937),
Walker v. Jameson, 140 Ind. 591, 37 N.E. 402 (1895). A city cannot
license a business in the absence of a statute conferring such
authority. Shuman v. Fort Wayne, 127 Ind., 109 26 N.E. 560 (1891).
Nor enlarge powers conferred by statute. Jeffersonville v. Nagle,
191 Ind. 70, 132 N.E. 4 (1921).
Courts will not inquire into the reasonableness of ordinances
enacted pursuant to express legislative authorization, but an ordi-
nance enacted by virtue of a general grant or of an implied power
may be subject to judicial inquiry as to its reasonableness. Gen.
Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309 (1930),
Stuck v. Beech Grove, 201 Ind. 66, 163 N.E. 483 (1929), Champer
v. Greencastle, 138 Ind. 339, 35 N.E. 14 (1894). Under a plenary
grant, a yearly license fee of $250 for each pool table for hire is
not unreasonable. Wysong v. Lebanon, 163 Ind. 132, 71 N.E. 194
(1904).
ARobbins v. Shelby Co. Tax Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887). In Sellersburg
v. Stanford, 209 Ind. 229, 198 N.E. 437 (1935) it was held that
a drummer of a Kentucky company in which state the goods were
located, was a peddler in a town where he solicited orders for
goods delivered in the future. This is a sharp break from a line of
cases declaring that ordinances regulating the sale, or negotiations
for the sale, of goods located outside the state and to be delivered
in the future are interferences with interstate commerce and un-
enforceable. Rushville v. Heyneman, 186 Ind. 1, 114 N.E. 69 (1917),
South Bend v. Martin, 142 Ind. 31, 41 N.E. 315 (1895), McLaughlin
v. South Bend, 126 Ind. 471, 26 N.E. 185 (1890); see Martin v.
Rosedale, 130 Ind. 109, 113, 29 N.E. 410, 411 (1892).
5 Van Huffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. 535 (1866).
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have found expression in the field of conscious, overt law-
making, it should be noted that a most vicious policy of dis-
crimination can be-and undoubtedly is-effectuated by un-
equal enforcement and administration of city ordinances. For
example, the opportunity for favoritism in the issuance of
local licenses offers untold possibilities for abuse. Also, the
fact that unconstitutional ordinances are frequently enacted
and that ordinance violators frequently are not financially
capable of becoming litigants6 add credence to the belief
that an unconstitutional ordinance is often an effective trade
barrier.
THE TAXING POWER
The municipal taxing power is a common device for the
equalization of the competitive level between local residents
who are taxpayers and non-locals who make no substantial
contributions to the support of local government. In addi-
tion to exacting a license fee, one city imposed a tax of sev-
eral per cent on the daily sales at auction of articles not
produced or grown in the state.7 Attacking the problem in a
different way, an amendment to a city charter exempting
from taxation certain personal property of residents, the
purpose of which was clearly to place the resident business-
man on the same competitive basis with certain non-residents
who were escaping taxation, was approved by the Indiana
Supreme Court in the case of Fitch v. Madison.8 In approv-
ing this exemption the Court gave considerable weight to the
fact that:
"Madison was a commercial city; many of her citizens
were engaged in trade and commerce .... It was the common
interest of the city that trade and commerce should be encour-
aged as it aided in bringing to the city both population and
wealth."9
As might have been inferred from the preceding discus-
sion some municipal tax measures have the anomalous ef-
fect of favoring the non-resident. Consequently an ordinance
requiring the same fee from the owners of all vehicles used
6 Particularly is this true in the case of peddlers, hawkers, and itinerant
merchants.
7New Albany (1842).
8 24 Ind. 425 (1865).
9 Id at 428.
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upon the streets, results in injury to the resident taxpayer.
Thus the Supreme Court of Indiana, observed that:
"Indeed he (a non-resident wagon owner) is at an ad-
vantage as compared with the city resident; he has paid no
taxes to improve the streets and yet he uses them day after
day in his business quite the same as a resident . . . If this
ordinance favors anyone it is the non-resident rather than the
resident."1o
Elaborating on this position the court in Terre Haute v.
Kerseyll definitely decided that ordinances of this type were
enacted as an exercise of the taxing power and not of the
police power, as had been stated in a previous case. In a
subsequent action involving the same parties it was held that
since an attempt had been made to tax the vehicles of some
non-residents, a vehicle tax ordinance was not invalid merely
because it failed to tax the vehicles of all non-residents who
habitually used the city streets.12 When a city enacts two
ordinances each imposing a fee upon vehicles, one as a tax
and the other as a police measure, the owner of a vehicle
for hire must pay both fees.
13
It seems apparent that in the case of the vehicle tax
ordinances cities were primarily concerned with raising rev-
enue for the construction and repair of their streets. It is
equally apparent, however, that under such a uniform tax
policy a certain class of persons were receiving more munici-
pal services than they were paying for. To meet such situ-
ations some cities exempted residents from taxation and
others levied a special tax on "foreign" articles in an effort
to make them "pay their way." Thus, although infrequent,
the revenue raising power has been used to close the fissures
in a competitive economic system which geography some-
times creates.
LICENSING
By means of the licensing power the largest number of
municipal trade barriers and burdens have been created. Al-
though the constitutional limitations on ordinance-making pre-
viously set forth are applicable, ordinances of this type are
10 Tomlinson v. Indianapolis, 144 Ind. 142, 146, 43 N.E. 9, 10 (1895).
11159 Ind. 300, 64 N.E. 469 (1902).
'2 Kersey v. Terre Haute, 161 Ind. 471, 68 N.E. 1027 (1904).
13 Hogan v. Indianapolis, 159 Ind. 523, 65 N.E. 525 (1902).
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usually attacked on the ground that they violate the priv-
ileges and immunities clauses of the state or federal constitu-
tion.
The privileges and immunities section of the Indiana con-
stitution is violated by an ordinance which fails to provide
a fixed and definite fee and which does not state the dura-
tion of the license. 14 It is violated further by an ordinance
which allows the municipal authorities to discriminate arbi-
trarily in the issuance of licenses between citizens engaged in
the same business.15 Furthermore, in Graffty v. Rushville
the Supreme Court of Indiana held that an ordinance making
a two-fold territorial discrimination by licensing only non-
resident hawkers and peddlers selling articles neither the
growth nor manufacture of which occurred in the county was
unconstitutional as violating the privileges and immuni-
ties section of the state constitution. 6 Indulging in a gen-
eralization-admittedly hazardous-it appears that many of
the discriminatory techniques employed by Indiana cities
against non-residents are unconstitutional. The only limita-
ton was suggested by a dictum that:
. . common councils may without doubt prescribe the
qualifications in respect to residence . . . of those who may
exercise vocations which are the proper subjects of police
regulations.... "IT
Thus, a residence qualification as a condition for a license to
engage in business is prima facie valid, although it may have
the effect of absolutely prohibiting competition from non-
residents and transients. In addition, in Gordon v. Indianap-
olis, the court held that cities may make reasonable classifica-
tions of persons engaging in business. 8
14 Bills v. Goshen, 117 Ind. 221, 20 N.E. 115 (1889).
15 Richmond v. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112, 28 N.E. 312 (1891), Plymouth v.
Schultheis, 135 Ind. 339, 35 N.E. 12 (1893).
16 107 Ind. 502, 8 N.E. 609 (1886), since the seller was not engaged in
interstate commerce, the court went too far when it stated that
the ordinance violated the interstate commerce clause of the fed-
eral constitution. An ordinance licensing breweries, distilleries
and depots which, on its face, discriminates in favor of residents
as against non-residents is invalid. Indianapolis v. Bieler, 138 Ind.
30, 36 N.E. 857 (1893). On the other hand, a similar ordinance
drafted, however, so as to include within the definition of a "depot"
only non-resident breweries shipping beer to resident agents for
local delivery is not discriminatory as against non-resident brewer-
ies. Schmidt v. Indianapolis, 168 Ind. 631, 80 N.E. 632 (1907).
17 Graffty v. Rushville, 107 Ind. 502, 509, 8 N.E. 609, 612 (1886).
18 204 Ind. 79, 183 N.E. 124 (1932).
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In reliance on these judicially approved powers most of
the cities studied have adopted ordinances regulating persons
and businesses. Itinerant merchant ordinances are by far the
most common. 9 The validity of these ordinances has never
been considered by the Indiana Supreme Court. But, since a
state law licensing transient merchants does not violate the
privileges and immunities section of the Indiana constitu-
tion,20 a fair implication is that reasonable ordinances adopted
under the authority of that statute are valid.21 The earlier
ordinances only licensed "foreign,"22 "traveling,12 "tran-
sient, ' 24 or "itinerant"25 merchants. "Residents" were ex-
empted. 2  In the later ordinances those persons, on the one
hand, who are to be protected and those, on the other hand,
who are to bear the burden are more clearly particularized.
In some ordinances itinerant merchants have been defined as
persons "not engaged in a permanent business in the city" ;27
or who are "located temporarily in the city" ;28 or as persons
"who have not been residents of the city"' 29 for a certain
length of time; or as persons "who have no intention of be-
coming bona, fide residents of the city."3 0 These definitions are
usually accepted as reasonable classifications of the trade.2 '
19 There were sixty-nine ordinances covering a ninety-six year range
(1842-1938) and during forty different years they were passed.
During the period 1880-1890 sixteen ordinances were passed. From
1900-1920 fifteen were adopted, the majority during the latter ten
years. Thirty-two were enacted from the World War to 1938..
Fifteen were passed during the 1920's and fifteen during the first
eight years of the 1930's. Twenty-two were enacted from 1925-1935.
20 Levi v. State, 161 Ind. 251, 68 N.E. 172 (1903). "The classification
. is a natural and reasonable one. . . ". Id at 256, 68
N.E. at 174.
21 Compare Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 42-409, with Ind. Stat.
Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 48-1407 cl.37.22 Fort Wayne (January 4, 1842).
23 Peru (May 12, 1857), South Bend (Ord. No. 394, 1875).
24 Fort Wayne (April 24, 1874).
25 Greencastle (February 27, 1856).
26 Greencastle (February 27, 1856), Delphi (1866).
2 7 Lafayette (March 25, 1889).
28 Brazil (Ord. No. 557, 1889), Washington (May 8, 1893).
29 Peru (December 9, 1884).
30 Brazil (Ord. No. 557, 1889), Washington (May 8, 1893).
31 It would appear that if the itinerant merchant, hawker, or peddler
does not compete with the local resident, one of the justifications
for a trade barrier disappears. Notwithstanding, these ordinances
usually apply to the sale of "goods, wares or merchandise"; there
is no recognition that the transient may offer for sale goods not
sold locally. Consider the vending of "tropical fruits". In some
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Still another technique which has been used for burden-
ing itinerant and non-resident merchants is to license bill
posting or the distribution of circulars or other advertising
matters, exempting at the same time resident merchants
advertising their own businesses. Ordinances of this type
have been enacted by four cities.3 2  In the case of Eales v.
Ba'rbourville, a Kentucky case, it was held that such an ordi-
nance was void because it discriminated against non-resi-
dents. 33
Attempts to exclude the itinerant photographer have been
numerous.3 4  As the license required applied only to those
who go from house to house,3 5 or to those who have no "es-
tablished place of business"3 6 (a business residence within a
city of from three to twelve months)37 by definition, resident
photographers usually pay no license fees. Validity of dif-
fering classifications relating to those "making and selling
photographs"38 has not been doubted. Thus, a larger fee
levied upon transient and traveling photographers than upon
resident photographers it was decided in the Kansas case of
Caldwell v. Prunella9 does not invalidate the ordinance.
Another occupational group to feel the effect of muni-
places the transient seller went unlicensed. Lafayette (March 25,
1889). While in others he was expressly licensed. Greencastle (June
9, 1884), Brazil (Ord. No. 557, 1889). In the former perhaps the
transient was the only source of supply.
It early became customary to exempt non-residents selling farm and
dairy products. Peru (March 6, 1874), Brazil (Ord. No. 557, 1889).
Non-residents vending books, newspapers and religious tracts were,
also, exempted. Lafayette (March 25, 1889), Brazil (Ord. No. 557,
1889). Thus, in legislation dealing with itinerant merchants, hawk-
ers and peddlers a consumer interest in foodstuffs, education,
religion and the transmission of knowledge has been recognized;
and, to that extent, a trade barrier policy is modified.
32 Clinton (Ord. No. 42, 1933), Bedford (1902), Washington (August
8, 1898), New Albany (1894).
3 177 Ky. 216, 197 S.W. 634 (1917).
34Eighteen ordinances discriminated against non-residents. Thirteen
were enacted from 1921-1936, nine being passed during the last six
years. The ordinances, as a whole, covered a twenty-eight year
period (1908-1936), and in eleven different years the discriminatory
ordinances were passed.
35 Marion (Ord. No. 5, 1933).
36 Linton (June 6, 1921).
37 Fort Wayne (Ord. No. 1768, 1933) Terre Haute (Ord. No. 10, 1933),
Bedford (October 6, 1936).
38 Brazil (Ord. No. 178, 1926), Sullivan (Ord. No. 91, 1925).
s9 57 Kan. 511, 46 Pac. 949 (1896).
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cipal trade barriers has been that of hawkers and peddlers. 40
At first, licenses were not required from residents.41 In
other cases licenses were issued only at the discretion of the
mayor. 42  Both devices appear to be unconstitutional un-
der the Indiana cases. The tendency lately has been, how-
ever, to license all hawkers and peddlers charging residents
of the city and sometimes of the county a lower fee,48 but
even this provision was held by the court of a sister state to
be discriminatory against non-residents.44 Another common
provision has been to exempt resident hawkers and peddlers
who produce or manufacture the articles they sell.45
Junk peddlers are usually licensed under separate ordi-
nances. There were two ordinances stating that to obtain a
license the applicant shall be a "bona fide resident" of the
city.46 As previously stated, there is an Indiana dictum in
support of the validity of residence qualifications as a condi-
tion for a license. Nevertheless, in the case of Lipkin v.
Duffy, the New Jersey court held that the requirement that
in order to obtain a license for the operation of a junk yard
a person shall be a resident of the city for two years was an
unreasonable discrimination against non-residents. 47
Discrimination against non-resident auctioneers has been
common in municipal ordinances. 4 Ordinances licensing only
40 Peddlers go from house to house while hawkers sell at outcry. There
were twenty-two ordinances discriminating against non-residents,
half of which were passed before 1886. There is a striking absence
of discriminatory ordinances from the 1890's to within the last few
years. In the 1930's there was an increase in the number of such
ordinances passed. The ordinances, as a whole, cover a seventy-
eight year period (1856-1934); in eighteen years of this period the
ordinances were enacted.
41 Princeton (Ord. No. 10, 1873), New Albany (Ord. No. 184, 1861),
Delphi (1886). An ordinance which exempts residents is void be-
cause it discriminates against non-residents. Sayre v. Phillips, 148
Pa. 482, 24 Atl. 76 (1892).
42 Fort Wayne (April 24, 1874), New Albany (July 8, 1875), Terre
Haute (November 8, 1886).
43 Mishawaka (Ord. No. 718, 1932), Bloomington (Ord. No. 33, 1929),
Whiting (Ord. No. 247, 1913).
4 State v. Orange, 50 N.J.L. 389, 13 Atl. 240 (1888).
45 Bloomington (Ord. No. 33, 1929), New Albany (October 3, 1904).
46 Marion (Ord. No. 17, 1930), Kokomo (Ord. 2495, 1927).
1 118 N.J.L. 84, 191 Atl. 288 (1937).
48 There were thirty-nine ordinances discriminating against non-resi-
dents, twenty-two having been enacted before 1890. The 1870's saw
the greatest activity when eleven were passed. None was discovered
in the 1920's and only three in the 1930's. Altogether they covered
a ninety-year period (1841-1931), and the ordinances were enacted
in twenty-eight years.
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non-residents4 9 would apparently be unconstitutional under
the Indiana cases. Licensing residents at a lower rate than
non-residentsO might be unconstitutional also if the differ-
ential was unreasonable. As a rule, the ordinances exempt
sales of articles the growth or manufacture of which took
place in the county where the city is located, and the sales
of live stock, farm utensils or household articles belonging
to residents of the city.51 In Indiana, a requirement that the
licensee shall be a bona fide resident merchant in whose
possession the goods shall have been for several months pre-
ceding the proposed auction52 has been sustained; although
among the cases elsewhere there is a split of authority."
Strangely, the policy of these ordinances appears to be dual
and conflicting-to facilitate the sale of locally manufactured
or produced articles and to protect local merchants selling in
the regular course of business 4
In recent years several cities have passed ordinances
regulating the sale at auction of jewelry, precious stones and
metals. As a condition for a license these ordinances imposed
a residence qualification either of six months" or a year.5 6
In Gordon v. Indianapolis this was held to be a reasonable
classification.57 Although not passing upon this residence
qualification the Court by way of dictum suggested that"...
a transient stock, or that of an itinerant merchant, ...is
within the restrictive or prohibitive language of the ordin-
ance." 528 This judicial utterance is expressive of the funda-
mental trade barrier policy. The information available points
to the conclusion that it is the larger cities of the state, name-
ly, those of the first, second, or third classes which have
49 Greencastle (1860), Delphi (1866), Kokomo (1867).50 Bloomington (Ord. No. 11 1876).
51 Peru (May 5, 1857), Greencastle (March 23, 1869), Hammond (Ord.
No. 11, 1889), Angola (Ord. No. 13, 1906).
52 East Chicago (Ord. No. 2027, 1931), Hammond (Ord. No. 2191, 1930).
5
3 A residence requirement as a condition for such a license is valid.
Moore v. Oklahoma City, 161 Okla. 205, 17 P. (2d) 953 (1932).
Contra: Con. v. Loeb, 245 Ky. 843, 54 S.W. (2d) 373 (1932).
54 The policy to protect merchants selling in the regular course of busi-
ness, also, finds expression in the Bulk Sales Acts. Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1933) § 33-201.
55 Marion (Ord. No. 24, 1931).
56 Mishawaka (Ord. No. 809, 1936), South Bend (Ord. No. 2860, 1930).
57204 Ind. 79, 183 N.E. 124 (1932).
58 Gordon v. Indianapolis, 204 Ind. 79, 83, 183 N.E. 124, 125 (1932).
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found it necessary to protect their local jewelers against the
competition of non-residents.
Ordinances licensing and regulating itinerant and non-
resident laundry, dry cleaning and pressing businesses have
been enacted recently by six cities.09 That the ordinances re-
sult from active competition between local areas is evident
from the location of the cities adopting the ordinances-two
cities adjoin each other; two are sixteen miles apart; and the
other two are within thirty-one miles of each other.
The methods of exclusion adopted by the ordinances are
diverse. One method is to require a license from businesses
having no principal office in the city ;6o another is to demand
a fee for each truck, agency, or branch store used in the
city when the garments are processed elsewhere ;61 and still
another method requires non-residents to keep on deposit
with the city building inspector a sum sufficient to pay all
costs of visiting and inspecting the principal place of busi-
ness.
0 2
There is a clear conflict among the cases as to the con-
stitutionality of ordinances of this type. On the one hand, the
classification of persons according to their maintenance or
non-maintenance of plants or places of business within the
municipality has been held discriminatory;6 3 while on the
other hand, this fact has been held a sufficient basis for
reasonable classification. 64
Licenses also have been required from dealers in motor
vehicles and motor vehicle parts. These ordinances generally
are discriminatory. One city demands a license from only
transient dealers.6 ' Other cities impose residence require-
ments as conditions for a license. 6 Inasmuch as these
ordinances were adopted by cities of the second and third
59East Chicago (Ord. No. 3313, 1937), Hammond (Ord. No. 2423, 1937),
Marion (Ord. No. 40, 1933), Peru (September 27, 1932), Brazil
(Ord. No. 78, 1932), Terre Haute (Ord. No. 8, 1932).
60 Brazil (Ord. No. 78, 1932).
61 Hammond (Ord. No. 2423, 1937), East Chicago (Ord. No. 2213, 1937),
Peru (September 27, 1932), Terre Haute (Ord. No. 8, 1932).
62 Marion (Ord. No. 40, 1933).
6 3 Bueneman v. Santa Barbara, 8 Cal. (2d) 405, 65 P. (2d) 884 (1937).
64 Richmond Linen Supply Co. v. Lynchburg, 160 Va. 644, 169 S.E. 554,
(1933) aff'd 291 U.S. 641 (1934), reh. denied 291 U.S. 648 (1934).
r Terre Haute (Ord. No. 7. 1931).
6r, East Chicago (Ord. No. 2280, 1939), Fort Wayne (Ord. No. 1931,
1938), Hammond (Ord. No. 2399, 1936), Marion (1930).
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classes, the problem may be peculiar to the larger cities. Fur-
ther, with one exception, each ordinance was adopted by a
border city.
Even taxicabs and motor busses-the twentieth century
counterparts of hacks and carriages-have felt the effects of
the trade barrier policy.67 In this group of ordinances the
discriminatory techniques employed have generally been, first,
licensing only non-residents 8 which is unconstitutional and,
second,-in keeping with a modern trend which is constitu-
tional-imposing residence requirements.6 9
Analogous to an interstate compact or agreement is the
solution reached in one of those conflicts where each of two
adjoining cities demanded a license from all persons operat-
ing cabs within the city.70 After about a dozen years, one
city now provides that its taxicab ordinance shall not apply
to cabs from neighboring municipalities which only dis-
charge and do not solicit passengers.7 1
Ordinances which license temporary businesses; bank-
rupt, fire, assignee sales, and branch stores are included here
because one out of every five contained the very significant
expression that they applied to goods "previously offered
for sale elsewhere. ' ' 72 Notwithstanding the apparent harm-
lessness of these ordinances, they seem to disclose a two-
fold discrimination, namely, against non-residents and against
merchandise brought into the city for sale other than in the
regular course of business.73
Preference usually is given to local produce dealers. It
will be recalled that under itinerant merchants, hawkers and
peddlers ordinances it is unnecessary for farmers residing in
67 Fourteen ordinances discriminating against non-residents were dis-
covered and except for about the first quarter of this century they
were enacted with periodical regularity. These ordinances covering
a seventy-three year period (1863-1936) were adopted in twelve
years.
68 Sullivan (Ord. No. 101, 1886), Delphi (July 27, 1886), Terre Haute
(1890).
69 South Bend (Ord. No. 2979, 1932), East Chicago (Ord. No. 2176,
1936), Bloomington (Ord. No. 9, 1936).
70 South Bend (Ord. 1817, 1915), Mishawaka (Ord. No. 443, 1916).
71 South Bend (Ord. No. 2979, 1932).
72 Although "elsewhere" could mean elsewhere in the city, the authors
believe that it is the more subtle connotation of the word which
is the true expression of the legislative intent.
73 There were twenty-five ordinances, twenty-one of which were en-
acted in the period 1890-1910. Two such ordinances were passed
in the early 1930's.
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the county and selling their own produce to obtain licenses.74
That some produce dealers "require" further protection is
evidenced by those ordinances which require a license, first,
from itinerant produce dealers75 and, secondly, from those
persons selling farm and dairy products from railway cars
and warehouses, exempting commission merchants owning
warehouses.7 6  Another city apparently tries to solve the
problem by demanding a permit for motor vehicles trans-
porting property for sale, the buyer of which has not been
determined at the point of destination by the person con-
trolling the truck at the point of origin.7 7 To the statement
previously made that a city has an interest not to burden
unduly the source of its food supply 8 must now be added the
qualification that this protection will not be extended to
foodstuffs produced beyond the immediate locality and which
are brought from a distance into the city to compete with
locally grown products. The constitutionality of these ordi-
nances will be determined by the ease with which a court
can be convinced that this legfslation is aimed at the way
in which a particular business is conducted, that there is a
reasonable classification, and that there is no overt dis-
crinination against non-residents as such.
Finally, there were ordinances licensing isolated trades
and businesses but not occurring with sufficient frequency
to justify separate consideration. It should be recorded that
ordinances exist which discriminate in one way or another,
against non-residents operating games of skill;79 municipal
markets;80 plumbers;S1 undertaking and embalming;82 build-
ing contractors ;83 scissor grinding, knife sharpening and um-
brella repair;84 and employment offices.8 5
74 See note 31 supra.
75 South Bend (Ord. No. 3032, 1933).
7 0 Terre Haute (Ord. No. 1, 1931), Hammond (Ord. No. 852, 1908),
Peru (December 27, 1904).
77 Bicknell (Ord. No. 165, 1935).
78 See note 31 supra.
79 Boonville (Ord. No. 7, 1937).80 Terre Haute (Ord. No. 26, 1925).
81 Bedford (June 1, 1909), Brazil (Ord. No. 365, 1905).
82 Hammond (Ord. No. 818, 1908).
8 Lafayette (April 12, 1897).
84 Terre Haute (June 20, 1882).
85 Fort Wayne (April 24, 1874).
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POLICE POWER
Attention will now be directed to some of the more strik-
ing instances in which a trade barrier policy has found ex-
pression in municipal ordinances under the guise of the
police power.
For the reason that practically all the itinerant merchant
ordinances enacted during the last two decades required the
merchants to post bonds, it can be said that this provision
has now become a part of the permanent fabric of this type
of ordinance . 6  The purpose of the bond ostensibly is to
protect buyers injured through the deceit, fraud or misrep-
resentation of the seller. Since this provision applies only
to itinerants the bona fides of such legislation may be ques-
tioned. But there can be no doubt that such a provision im-
poses a further burden upon the transient. The objections
made against itinerant merchant ordinances apply with
equal force to itinerant photographers87 and the itinerant
laundering, cleaning and pressing businesses8 since they, too,
are usually required to post bonds.
With almost the same speed with which the shot fired
at Concord was "heard 'round the world," an ordinance passed
by the Town of Green River, Wyoming, became famous over
night and has been copied by other municipalities through-
out the country. By the terms of this ordinance:
"The practice of going in and upon private residence
• . . by solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants and
transient venders of merchandise, not having been requested
or invited so to do by the owners . . . is . . . declared . . .
a nuisance."
Suffice it to say that there is a split of authority as to the
validity of these ordinances.8 9  Although some Indiana cities
have enacted such ordinances, 90 the question of their consti-
tutionality has never been considered by the Supreme Court.
That ordinances of this type are a most effective trade re-
striction is too obvious to require elaboration.
S6Brazil (Ord. No. 2065, 1925), Boonville (Ord. No. 3, 1926), Delphi
(January 24, 1933), East Chicago (Ord. No. 2140, 1935).
87Brazil (Ord. No. 178,1926), Sullivan (Ord. No. 91, 1925).
s8Peru (September 27, 1932), Terre Haute (Ord. No. 8, 1932).
s9 Such an ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power. Green
River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F .(2d) 112 (C.C.A.10th 1933).
Contra: Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 180 So. 347 (1938).
Po South Bend (Ord. No. 3136, 1935), Brazil (Ord. No. 94, 1933).
MUNIcIPAL TRADE BARRIERS
Also, under their police power several Indiana cities
have greatly limited the distribution of handbills and other
advertising matters. An ordinance prohibiting such distribu-
tion
"by placing or causing the same to be placed in any
automobile . . . yard . . . porch . . . mail box . . . not
in possession or under the control of the person . . . so dis-
tributing . . . "
but exempting newspapers was upheld as a valid exercise
of the police power in the case of Goldblatt Bros. Co. v. East
Chicago.91 In that case the Court said that the ordinance
amply protected the privilege to distribute advertising matters
where there existed a permission from the occupier of the
property to come upon his premises.9 2 In reaching its con-
clusion did the Court by implication decide that there was
no implied invitation for distributors of advertising matter
to come upon private premises? This is important in light of
the fact that one of the principal grounds for declaring a
"Green River" ordinance unconstitutional is, as some courts
have said, that there usually is an implied invitation for busi-
ness solicitors to come upon private premises.9 3
One city makes it unlawful to distribute handbills when
the purpose is the financial gain of businesses outside the
county.914
Even local printers came in for their share of protection
at the expense of non-residents. The ordinances of some
cities provide that "nothing herein contained shall be con-
strued to authorize any merchant or dealer to circulate ad-
vertising prepared by . . . companies elsewhere."' ' 9 On still
another occasion the municipal printing was guaranteed to
local printers by means of an ordinance providing that all
printing used and ordered by the city shall bear the imprint
of the local trade council. 96
CONCLUSION
In 1610 a custom of the City of London and a by-law
passed to enforce it providing:
0l 211 Ind. 621, 6 N.E. (2d) 331 (1937).
92 Id., at 623 6 N.E. (2d) at 332.
03Prior v. White, 132 Fla 1, 19, 180 So. 347,355 (1938).
O-Bluffton (December 26, 1922).
9 Bedford (1902), Washington (August 8, 1898).9OFort Wayne (Ord. No. 153, 1900). This shows a preference also,
for union printers.
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"that no person whatsoever, not being free of the City
of London, shall . . . keep any shop . . . or place whatsoever
. . . to sell . . . or use any trade, occupation, mystery or
handicraft . . . within said City. .. .
were held to be valid.97
In 1934 the Indiana Supreme Court in support of a
policy of discrimination against chain stores started with
the major premise, that:
"This court has upheld statutes discriminating against
the itinerant merchant and peddler in the interest of the local
merchant. If protection of the local merchant is a sufficient
basis for a policy of discrimination against peddlers and small
itinerant merchants, it is difficult to see why it should not
afford a sufficient basis for a policy of discrimination against
chain store organization."98
That the present economy-and there have been former
ones-sanctions trade restrictions is the only conclusion con-
sonant with the fact that there is and has been a large
number of trade barrier ordinances in Indiana. The "for-
eigner" is still looked upon with suspicion. It is generally felt
that a taxpaying merchant has a stake in the community and
his business deserves special protection,," When trade is too
greatly restricted, however, it is the duty of the courts under
our system of government to declare invalid the more flag-
rant violations of the constitutional taboos.
Lastly, throughout this discussion a non-partisan may
have been impressed by the idea that the solution to this
problem belongs, primarily, to the disciples of Adam Smith
and, secondarily, to the disciples of William Blackstone.
97 The Case of the City of London, 8 Co. Rep. 121 b, 77 Eng. Reports
658 (1610). To-day in England, however, there are apparently
no such municipal trade restrictions. 32 Halsbury's Laws of Eng-
land (2 ed., 1938) § 559.
99 Midwestern Petroleum Corp. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm., 206 Ind.
688, 703, 187 N.E. 882, 888 (1934).
9) "The thing to be restrained is the putting of goods the owners of
which may or may not have contributed by way of taxation to
the benefit of the municipality, in competition with the goods of
local merchants, every dollar's worth of whose stock has been sub-
jected to municipal taxation, and who has contributed to the social,
educational and financial prosperity of the city." Graffty v.
Rushville 107 Ind. 502, 506, 8 N.E. 609, 611 (1886). In 1936 ap-
proximately 40,000 retailers listed merchandise, furniture or fix-
tures for taxation. "Since more than 60,000 store licenses were
issued during that year, it would appear that a great many re-
tail stores were escaping property taxes altogether." The Report
of The Indiana Tax Study Sommission (1939) p. 19.
